This paper addresses some of the complex issues related to the so-called European Information Society from at least three interrelated perspectives: from theory (on the basis of a brief literature review), from practice (referring to a number of available surveys and research data) and from a policy perspective. It points at major contradictions in and between both European policy statements and the data collected as part of the ongoing Measuring Information Society (MIS) surveys. It concludes by formulating a number of recommendations for both policymakers and researchers. Ó
The major benefit of the PC revolution has been the way it has empowered people. The highway's low-cost communications will empower in an even more fundamental way. The beneficiaries won't just be technology-oriented individuals. As more and more computers are connected to high-bandwidth networks, and as software platforms provide a foundation for great applications, everyone will have access to most of the world's information (Gates, 1995, p. 111) .
Bill Gates cannot be accused of not being a true believer in the 'new economy' or 'dot.com society'. His Microsoft company is leading the 'race for the gold'. Nevertheless, even Bill Gates, at the end of his bible, raises some critical issues: Telematics and Informatics 19 (2002) www.elsevier.com/locate/tele (referring to a number of available surveys and research data) and from a policy perspective.
[The paper forms part of a general research project on Information Societies, which has already resulted in a number of publications (see Ricci, 1997 Ricci, , 1998 Ricci, , 2000 Servaes, , 1998 Burgelman, 1996, 2000; Servaes et al., 1997; Servaes and Wang, 1997; Wang et al., 2000) .]
Although our focus will be on Europe, we cannot but take other geographical dimensions into consideration as well. The globalization of social, cultural and economic relations is facilitated, and at the same time conditioned by developments in information and communication technology and their infrastructure. The consequences of this 'revolution' in human communications are multi-dimensional in character, affecting economic, political and social life on national, international and local levels.
Europe was a latecomer in the new gold rush
In many ways the European plans to build an information society (IS) emerged as a reaction to Japanese and American initiatives. As in many previous technological projects, European policies on information and communication technologies (ICT) lagged behind the policies of its main global competitors.
This situation has slightly changed since the beginning of the 1980s when it became clear that information and communication would be one of the main technological factors and markets for the future. From then onwards Europe has spent a growing amount of its R&D on ICTs. This went hand in hand with a radical change in policy orientation. Starting from the Green Paper on Television Policy (Television without Frontiers, in Commission (1984) ), the whole area of communications became gradually and more or less totally liberalized. Certainly from 1998 onwards, the whole ICT field became deregulated.
Although in the 1980s the term 'information society' as such was not used in the R&D and policy discourses of the EU, the idea underlying it was nevertheless captured in most R&D programs in terms of a 'wired society', 'broadband networks' and so on. Thus, the EU did not start from scratch in this field. On the contrary, a very considerable research effort was made. Nevertheless, in terms of user acceptance, these first generations of large-scale R&D projects in integrated communications were not very successful. As one critic observed, billions of ECUs were spent on all kinds of research into broadband, HDTV and so on, but there was not ''one single consumer in sight'' (Garnham, 1994, p. 47) .
This might explain why, when the idea of the 'information highway' was officially launched by the Clinton-Gore administration, Europe almost immediately integrated it into its own discourse. First it appeared under the label of 'trans-European networks', in the so-called Delors White Paper (see Commission, 1993) , but more prominently in the Bangemann report (see Commission, 1994a) . By doing so, Europe clearly did not want to lag behind this time and, at the same time, got a brand new grand project for its official policy (and justification for all the billions of ECU spent). This explains why, from 1994 onwards, EU policy both accelerated the liberalization of its communications market and put an enormous effort towards more general awareness building measures and PR campaigns. Historians of this period will undoubtedly uncover the beginning of a digital 'gold fever' reflected in the discourse and policy of the EU.
Two waves of IS-rhetoric
The first initiative of the European Commission in its 'information society planning' of the 1990s was the 1993 White Paper 'Growth, Competitiveness and Employment'. This paper was prepared by the Commission under the chairmanship of the former French Socialist Minister of Finance, Jacques Delors. It starts from a social-democratic concern for job creation and equal opportunity combined with a focus on Europe's competitiveness in an increasingly internationalizing world economy. This rather neo-Keynesian White Paper was followed by the much more neo-liberal Bangemann report in 1994 on the basis of an initiative by the Council. This report, chaired by the former German FDP (liberal) Minister Martin Bangemann, focuses more on the issues of liberalization of telecommunications and the primacy of the private sector in the development of an information society.
Therefore, the information society policies of the European Union in the nineties can be presented as two waves, one in the first part of the decade with an emphasis on liberalization of telecommunications and information technology development, and the other in the second half with more focus on social aspects of information society developments. This understanding is, to a large extent, well founded especially if the first wave is seen as being represented by the Bangemann report and the 'Action Plan ' of 1994 ' of (Commission, 1994b . However, it also portrays the development in too rosy colors as a continuous evolution without the differences of opinion or emphases that have existed.
In 1995, a high-level expert group (HLEG) and an Information Society Forum were established to analyze ''the social aspects of the information society'', as the HLEG characterized it in its final policy report 'Building the European Information Society for us all' (see also Commission, 1997a; HLGIS, 1994) . As a justification for this focus, HLEG wrote: ''Until that time, the debate on the emerging information society had been dominated by issues relating to the technological and infrastructure challenges and the regulatory economic environment''. There was, therefore, a perceived need for re-focusing on the social dimensions of the 'European model', in line with the white paper 'Growth, Competitiveness and Employment', as stated in the HLEG report.
The development of the EU information society policy has thus been characterized by an oscillation between broader social concerns and a more technology-and market-oriented focus. Lately, starting with, among others, the Commission-communication 'The implications of the information society for European Union policies -preparing the next steps ' (Commission, 1996c) and the Green Paper 'Living and working in the information society: people first' (Commission, 1996b) , resulting in the 'Rolling action plan', 'Europe at the forefront of the global information society ' (Commission, 1996a) , the social aspects of information society developments have moved to the foreground in EU policy visions and statements.
In yet another document, 'The social and labor market dimension of the information society -people first -the next steps', the Commission suggests that information society policies should have as basic aims to: improve access to information, enhance democracy and social justice, promote employability and lifelong learning, strengthen the capacity of the EU economy to achieve high and sustainable growth and employment, achieve and enhance equal opportunity between men and women, promote inclusion and support people with special needs and those lacking opportunities to improve their position, and improve quality and efficiency of public administration (Commission, 1997b) .
These aims are given priority in the context of social and labor market dimensions (Johnston, 2000) . In other contexts, other issues have been given priority.
Furthermore, one of the reasons for this change of priority is that the liberalization of telecommunications has developed in a satisfactory way seen from the Commission's point of view. Therefore, other issues can now be given priority. However, the basic aims listed still remain an expression of a development in the EU information society policy. Most notably, educational policies and lifelong learning and the combination of information technology related policies with other policy areas have come to the fore in the last couple of years.
Nevertheless and once again, even the Commission admits that it still has a long way to go. Therefore, Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Gutteres called for the EU's first-ever IT summit that took place in March 2000 during his country's presidency of the Union. Top aide Maria Rodrigues, the chief organiser of this event, readily admitted that ''we have to recognize that Europe is late compared with the US regarding the transition to an innovation and knowledge society. We must speed up this transition not just because we are late but also so that we can find our own way -a European model'' (Jones, 1999, p. 30 Crooks, 2000; Mather, 2000; Anon., 2000) .
In sum, Europe clearly wanted no lagging behind this time and, at the same timethough not explicitly stated -got a brand new 'grand societal project' for its official policy. However, it remains to be seen whether a mixture of Marshall plan type of 'grand works' (the Delors imprint) with an unconditional belief in the market as the driving force (the Bangemann influence) has a feasible future. According to an editorial in the Wall Street Journal Europe on 24 March 2000 the direction should be: ''Government can serve best by creating a hospitable environment and then stepping back. . . Europe's 'Dot.Com Summit'. Let us hope it does not turn simply dotty'' (p. 10).
The information society indeed has become a discourse in which it is possible to integrate many of the seemingly disparate European ambitions: from competition policy over competitiveness to maintaining cultural diversity and subsidiarity. Or, as argued by Garnham (1997) : the claims made for telecommunications and IT as catalyst for economic development should be seen as good old political rhetoric. ''It meets the needs of politicians because it promises a technological fix to deep seated social and economic problems, but as a 'new' initiative it distracts attention away from the failure of previous similar initiatives to solve these problems'' (Garnham, 1997, p. 327) .
Is the European IS-policy sustainable?
With the benefit of hindsight, the question can be raised whether information society policies have not just sugarcoated a policy of telecommunication liberalization. Telecommunication liberalization was the main issue in the Bangemann report of 1993 and the 'Action Plan' of 1994 and is still the most notable result of the information society initiatives taken from the beginning of the 1990s.
However, such an understanding would be a misconception of the general outline of the EU information society policy. Telecommunication liberalization is not an alien element in this policy but an important integral part. Although there are disagreements on specific policy elements and directions, information society policies are answers to technological and international economic developments and general policy trends with a clear liberal taste, which is also why there is an overall consensus around EU information society policies even though they fluctuate and have different emphases depending on the people involved and the phases of development.
Therefore, it could be argued that the EU strategy is not sustainable in the medium and long term. The reason for this is that the principle of balance between productive and consumptive functions has thoroughly been neglected by policymakers and market parties. This is caused by the fact that the Commission and the politically accountable EU policymakers and institutions have assigned the transition to the digitized information economy to market forces and logics alone. This also explains why the EU failed to develop a longer-term vision of the future global networks.
Regarding the field of telecommunications and broadcasting, a distinction between liberal economic (in favor of deregulation) and cultural policies (mostly in favor of regulation), respectively, is visible in Europe. Early analyses of EU public policy, for instance, show that the EU was not anticipating an overall policy on the convergence of these formerly distinct services (Burgelman and Pauwels, 1991) . In telecommunications development the emphasis is on liberalization and deregulation, providing private corporations with a maximum of freedom to invest on the telecommunication networks. Public policy in the broadcasting field is guided by another logic. In the media sector political concerns to safeguard a public sphere of pluralism and national sovereignty leads to the ambition to offer a diverse media system, containing public as well as private media (Servaes and Heinsman, 1991; Servaes, 1991) .
As the two historically separately evolved sectors of telecommunications and broadcasting converge, the different policy consequences of the economic versus the cultural, and local versus international interests have to be taken into account. Research indicates, however, that the national, and especially the European policies regarding telecommunication services in general and broadcasting in particular are based on economic, not cultural, considerations. This trend increased after 1992 (Weymouth and Lamizet, 1996; Anon., 1997) .
Also the public service broadcasting structure and philosophy has undergone major changes throughout the last decades. These changes, initiated by internal as well as external factors, have affected the organizational and financial structures, and the programming of public service broadcasting (Wolton, 1990) . Therefore, it is doubtful whether European policies will serve the interests of the so-called smaller countries in the EU, for instance, Belgium or the Netherlands on the one hand, and whether these policies will be able to secure a free and balanced flow of information, ideas, opinions and cultural activities within the EU on the other hand (Servaes, 1993) . In other words, it is no longer sufficient to concentrate on a distinct sector from only a technological or an economic perspective; a multi-dimensional analysis of the different policy options and their respective consequences is necessary.
The convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting occurs at three levels: at the levels of networks (infrastructure), service provision, and corporate organization. In Europe policy decisions or policy perspectives are mainly technologically and/or commercially driven. A lot of attention focuses on the research concerning (and the implementation of) hardware. A lot of money is spent for the development of network infrastructure, broadcasting facilities, etc. (Foley, 2000; Salak, 2000) .
Second, regarding media ownership, we always seem to meet the same players in the different sectors on different global, regional and national levels. These are telecommunication operators, major publishing firms and media moguls. In most of the countries we observe that one or two of these actors (or a merger of them) control the telecommunication sector, major parts of the broadcasting sector and sometimes an important part of the print media (Grimes, 2000) .
Third, because of these concentration tendencies, national governments are afraid of broadcasting monopolies. Their legal reaction is the promulgation of anti-trust and anti-concentration laws. Examples of this legislation are the prohibition of controlling more than two national television networks and the restriction of market share percentage in the media landscape.
Last, the emphasis in public policymaking is on hardware. Software/content development is largely neglected.
As a result, there is no single road to the information society. Every country has its own particularities and these are very heavily determined by national political objectives. As in every dossier, subsidiarity plays an important role here too and different national authorities in Europe react differently to the plans of Brussels (and this mainly due to national specificities).
This becomes obvious from the analysis of the Nordic countries by Henten and colleagues (Henten et al., 1996; Henten, 1999; Henten and Kristensen, 2000) . To an outsider the Nordic countries may seem similar; there are many differences in economic structure that also apply to the ICT-producing industries. Henten and colleagues showed that the information society thinking of different European countries differed to a noticeable extent. The reason dealt with the differences in productive structures of the countries and the differences in points of departure and focus.
Or take the case of Greece. Greece is an EU member State, but at the same time is part of the periphery standing between the rich industrialized North and the poor developing South. Tonchev (2000) and Sarikakis and Terzis (2000) argue that, despite the citizens' needs and wishes, the promotion of the European Information Society in Greece is characterized by disproportionality.
Underlying assumptions
The policy of an IS has to be checked against its underlying assumptions. Starting from the assumption that information and communication technologies undoubtedly possess the potential to contribute to socio-cultural change, it can be questioned whether this potential will be converted into advantages for everyone under the given scenarios the EU has planned. As large-scale application of information and communication technology increases, new problems will arise which 'the market' as such will not be able to resolve. More and better regulatory mechanisms will have to be developed to deal with these. If it should appear that the means proposed by the European Commission representatives are inadequate to arrive at the intended result, then the current strategy will have to be amended, or, if necessary, an alternative strategy will have to be proposed. In other words, is it enough to state, as the fifth framework (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) for R&D of the EU does, that it has to be ''user friendly information society in the benefit for all''? These arguments and observations are presented and discussed in more detail by Venturelli (1997 Venturelli ( , 1998 and by KaitatziWhitlock (2000) .
At least five assumptions or hypotheses can be derived from a review of the literature:
The first one is that the visions are so alike, even if countries are different in many ways. Today, the visions in the different countries of the EU are very much in sync. There seems to have been a harmonization going on which has taken some time to initiate.
The second assumption is that everybody agrees on the visions and policy directions even though there are different interests in society, which should come out in 'revolutionary' transformations. The establishment of an information society is often described as a revolutionary development, likened to the transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society. However, the industrial revolution surely resulted in fierce clashes between groups, classes, ideologies, etc. This does not seem to be the case with the 'information revolution'. At a slightly less dramatic level, it can be noticed that in some countries, there are center-left governments and in others center-right governments. Still, the plans are very much the same, even when countries shift the political orientation of their governments.
A third and related assumption is the widespread support for the same visions in a period where the 'great narratives' are said to be vanishing. Information society visions have clearly become such a new narrative.
A fourth and, once again, connected assumption is that there is so much information society planning going on in a time when state planning is considered to be obsolete because of the policies of liberalization and the flexible circumstances that an information society is supposed to require.
A fifth assumption is based on the strong move to create a European culture through communications, particularly TV broadcasting. This is seen in some of the EU-directives, such as the emphasis on 51% of European material in television programming, etc. In many regions of Europe the most important development in the communications industry has not been the further dominance of global media, but the emergence of cultural-linguistic television markets. Triggered by policy deregulation and the rediscovery of autonomy by communities within a state -e.g., the Welsh and Gaelics in the UK, the Catalans and Basques in Spain and the Bretons in France -local and regional programs have become increasingly popular as have a number of thematic channels. Many of the proximity television programs are part of a public system. In the long run, market forces are expected to play a decisive role in their further development. But as it is only in those 'nations without state' that proximity television has enjoyed the most powerful support, whether the market will work for, or against, the further development of proximity television will depend upon the strength of the cultural and linguistic factors (De Moragas et al., 2000) .
Though a user-driven (and consequently more content-oriented) and user-specific policy framework may be preferred, a more corporate-driven economic rationale seems to become the norm. Both policy perspectives start from quite opposite assumptions, as shown in the following scheme (further developed in Burgelman and Verhoest, 1996) :
Measuring the information society (MIS)
Besides contradictory policies and questionable assumptions, the problem of measuring the information society also appears to be crucial for the organization of the scientific debate, for the industrial development and for the implementation of public policies.
The results of the Commission Surveys ''Measuring Information Society'' in 1995 (pilot), in 1997 (Eurobarometer 47) and in 1999 (Eurobarometer 51) present a timely information resource for all those scholars who still today, when the Internet seems to have become 'free and ubiquitous', think that the information society must remain a problematic field of scientific research and an overriding public policy for Europe.
The results of the surveys are striking. It becomes very clear that the rhetoric scenario that depicted a uniform, regional transition towards ''a society founded on electronics'' was radically contradicted by the data which emerged from the surveys.
[Data and interpretation of these surveys in this section has been adopted from Heinderyckx (1998), Ricci (1997 Ricci ( , 1998 Ricci ( , 2000 and Sarikakis and Terzis (2000) .]
Here Of all the technologies surveyed in 1999, the video recorder is the most mature (Fig. 1) . It has reached the flat part of its diffusion curve so that it is gradually being used by similar proportions of people in most countries and demographic groups. Only Greece and Portugal show significantly lower penetration rates.
Satellite dishes, by contrast with the VCR, is a much younger technology (Fig. 2) . The range of penetration levels (between 2% in Greece and 52% in Austria) is the highest of all technologies surveyed. Various factors attached to each country explain most of the discrepancies. For example, Belgium and the Netherlands are very heavily equipped with cable (see the following), so that there is only a narrow market for satellite dishes. High penetrations in Germany and Austria are best explained by the wide choice of German-speaking channels readily available by satellite. Other sources confirm Austria as the European country where satellite dishes are most widely used.
The varying proportions of people resorting to pay television should be considered in connection with the media landscape so particular to each country ( Fig. 3) . In Sweden, the high rates are due to the success of a few stations (Filmnet, TV1000, Canal+). In the UK, success is the result of a long-established tradition of pay television (Sky is the best example). France offers a wide choice of pay channels, and 15 years of success for Canal+ account for most of the high proportion of users. France and Spain also have a head start with digital packages that fall into this category. The development of digital packages and of terrestrial digital broadcasting will considerably modify the choice of pay television made available throughout Europe, so that this variable is likely to move significantly in the near future.
Teletext technology is widely available on most television sets manufactured in the past 10 years (Fig. 4) . Only old or low-end receivers are deprived of that feature. However, the data indicate that a number of people are either unaware that their television set is equipped or are unable or not willing to use teletext. The skills required to operate teletext properly are indeed quite different from those necessary to just operate the television.
The use of a personal computer is no longer marginal (Fig. 5) . A little over a third of all Europeans say they use a computer. Scandinavia and the Netherlands show significantly higher penetration figures. Do bear in mind that the question asked in this survey was about use, not ownership, so that these differences cover the penetration of computers in the workplace, at school, at the university as well as at home.
The use of CD-ROMs shows slightly more variation among countries (Fig. 6 ). If we assume that computers equipped with CD-ROM readers are either recent or high-end machines only, combining PC and CD-ROM use figures may be interpreted as an indication of the average age or quality of the computers used in different countries. However, one can assume that many people do use a personal computer and not a CD-ROM, even if there is one, be it by lack of skill or absence of need or even interest.
The modem is yet another feature requiring extra skills and cost (including continuing communication costs) (Fig. 7) . Motivation and need for using a modem do appear dramatically different among the eight countries to the right of the European average (16% or less of users), and the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands and particularly Denmark and Sweden where the modem achieves penetration figures comparable to CD-ROM and not too far from PCs. Unsurprisingly, the shape of the Internet users graph bears a strong resemblance to that of modems, illustrating the fact that the Internet is driving the modem market (Fig. 8) .
These 1999 findings are mostly confirmed by other sources, at least in the ranking of the countries (actual figures are difficult to compare because of the lack of consistency in question wording).
Two clusters
By reviewing descriptively the results of the 1995, 1997, and 1999 surveys, Ricci (2000) and Heinderyckx (1998) note that different technologies are used with various intensity across the European Union. They observed that some countries are more oriented towards television, others to the computer technology cluster:
On average, Europe shows a balanced growth between television and computer technologies. When considered together, the penetration figures of the four television technologies and the four computer technologies divide into six groups: 1. Sweden and Denmark both show much higher than average penetrations of both television and computer technologies. 2. Greece and Portugal, on the contrary, are significantly lower on both technology clusters. 3. Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Germany form a very compact group around the European average and seem to balance the use of both types of technologies. 4. Austria and the United Kingdom are higher than average on the television axis and about average on computer, so that it can be said that these two countries are more oriented towards television. 5. On the contrary, Luxembourg, Finland and the Netherlands are about average for television, but much higher up the PC technology axis, so that these countries appear more computer oriented. 6. France stands on its own, with PC technology use about average, but significantly below average for television (mostly due to very low use of teletext).
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Barriers to adoption
Furthermore, on the basis of the Information and Communication Technology Adoption Scale (ICTAS), which can be used as an integrated indicator of the use of modern information-and communication-related technologies (clustered around the television and the computer), the gap between northern and southern Europe is quite striking and quantifiable: the medium user countries form a central block of continental Europe (plus Ireland), the heavy users are found in Northern Europe, the light users are at the periphery of Southern Europe (Greece and Portugal).
What is keeping people from using these technologies? The notion of perceived need is central. Over half of the Europeans who are not interested in on-line services say they do not need them in their private life. Even a number of heavy using countries show high proportions of non-users feeling no need for on-line services. This fits perfectly into functionalist theory, and more particularly in uses and gratifications theory, which sees media in general as a mean to satisfy various needs. However, the concept of need and its use by respondents is to be taken with caution. Denying a need is in some cases a legitimate cover-up for ignorance, fear or lack of financial means.
Therefore, second to the absence of need is price, then perceived complexity. Here again, there is no clear-cut dichotomy between northern and southern Europe, with Germans, Belgians and Austrians just as repelled by complexity as Portuguese and Spaniards.
Women are more deterred by complexity than men (20% versus 16%). Noticeably, proportions of people finding these technologies too complicated vary significantly along demographic variables identified as key in predicting technology adoption: age, income and level of education. This shows that younger, wealthier and bettereducated Europeans are less likely to find online technologies too complicated.
This is yet another confirmation that these three demographic variables can be quite powerful in segmenting the technology market in as much as they are reliable predictors of barriers to adoption on the basis of perceived over-complexity. Any product development or marketing campaign will have to be concerned about the seeming or factual complexity of any innovation. It is likely that, among less deterred groups, complexity might, in fact, encourage the adoption of innovations which, for that particular target, will have to prove an increase in complexity or functionality while the opposite is true for convincing non-users that it is all too complicated for them.
The lack of time is an obstacle of increasing importance as we go higher up the income levels. Portugal, Greece and Ireland show significantly lower levels of respondents deterred by lack of time.
The age factor is also crucial in studying new technologies. We all know people around us who show some level of reluctance towards technologies for which they feel insufficient need or skills. The generation gap is obvious. This is where the full meaning of new in 'new technologies' comes to light. For a technology to change status from 'new' to 'aging' or 'obsolete' only takes the next innovation to hit the market.
There is a second dimension to the novelty of new technologies, the fact that it was unknown to its users beforehand. Depending on your age or your length of service, your ability or likeness to modify your behavior and adopt a new technology will vary. Older people are therefore more likely to remain longer on the non-adopter side while, at the other end of the age spectrum, the younger population will have little difficulty in adjusting.
The generation gap is not, in this case, to be seen as just another sign of older people's conservatism. New technologies, and the changes in behavior associated with them, have to pass the hurdle of lifestyle and habits that grow more deeply rooted as time passes. Something new might not seem like an improvement if only because of the immense time investment necessary to learn or re-learn previously acquired and much practiced behaviors. Younger people seemingly adopt innovations effortlessly. In fact, it is worth stressing that to a child, the keyboard of a computer is not newer than a pencil; learning how to type and send an e-mail is not any harder (probably less) than learning how to hand-write a letter, fold it into an envelope and apply a stamp; using a traditional phone confined to the wall plug might even seem unnatural as compared to using a mobile phone, just as going shopping might seem unpleasant and unwise as compared to ordering on-line.
Naturally this is all a matter of education, depending mostly on efforts developed by schools and parents. Yet one can hypothesize that younger generations will grow to be more enthusiastic adopters as they grow older, that is if they can be kept in a innovation-adoption dynamic which would prevent another generation gap when too radical an innovation would, in some time, leave them at the door, just like today's elderly seem to have missed the current train of innovations.
Therefore, Ricci (2000) argues that explanations can be found in what Kotler calls personal factors: position in the life cycle, economic conditions, and more generally 'life style' appeared to be strongly correlated to use of and interest for technologies (see Fig. 9 ).
A third cluster?
Also important is the very nature of a technological cluster and the position, the functional area, it intends to fill. Therefore, an additional distinction could be made between the two already identified clusters and a new emerging 'wireless' cluster. The Gobal System for Mobile (GSM) communications allows digital transmissions and broadband services which facilitate voice, data and video transmissions to mobile phones and other wireless devices. Universal Mobile Telecom Systems (UMTS), the so-called third generation of cell-phone networks, and broadband networks will bring high-speed Internet connections that are continuously available. The consumer's personal computer will no longer have to do so much computational work.
As is possible on an office network, the software that consumers use would not necessarily be installed on their PC. It could be hosted on mighty web servers and accessed simply from a web browser.
The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) enables mobile phones to download Internet sites designed in hypertext markup language (or HTML). i-Mode (a proprietary application developed by Japan's NTT and used by its mobile phone division NTT-DoCoMo) is similar to WAP but does not need reformatting to HTML. Observers expect that some level of convergence between i-Mode and WAP will take place by 2002 (Crampton, 2000) .
The 3G or third-generation networks that start coming on line in mid-2001 will provide voice, high-speed data and multi-media services at speeds of up to 2400 kilobits per second. Telecom planners intend to converge all competing standards worldwide so that users can access services regardless of their handset or location.
Some observers notice that Europe may have a competitive advantage in the mobile sector. Key players in the electronics business -especially Nokia and Ericsson -are based in Scandinavia. They contribute to a rapid growth in wireless technology. The Nordic region, for instance, has an Internet penetration of 41% compared with 37% in the US and 21% in the rest of Europe; mobile-phone penetration in capitals Stockholm and Helsinki is more than 90%. Another key to Europe's success is, according to Latour (2000, p. 28) , its new equity culture: ''Fueled by the arrival of the Economic and Monetary Union, a new breed of risk-taking CEOs have stepped up the merger-and-acquisition activity in Europe. Meanwhile, Fig. 9 . Personal factors influencing use of technology. Source: Kotler and Dubois (1994). young entrepreneurs are founding their own companies at a pace Europe has never seen before''.
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The multiple communities of the European information society
When one tries to evaluate with quantitative instruments the evolution of the informatization of our societies, abundant evidence emerges confirming that the penetration of the key technologies is indeed increasing with variable ratios in all EU member states.
Therefore, Ricci (2000, p. 163) observes: ''Surveys like the MIS show that large segments of European societies are not 'inside' the so-called 'information society' but 'next to it' or simply 'outside' it. This is a scientific finding and a political issue at the same time''.
He continues: ''The evolution of the Measuring Information Society surveys results showed that • a multi-faceted media system is in place in Europe -this new system is the sum of the traditional and innovative media all coexisting and all conflicting with one another to acquire a larger share of the financial/time budget of Europeans; • different kinds of society coexist today in Europe and use in different proportions the same set of media; these ''societies'' are the by-product of the social pressures generated by the media system and evolve dynamically by transferring continuously flow of 'citizens' in and out each main social aggregate (Ricci, 2000, p. 163 ).
If we adopt a quantitative view of the information society based on electronic media usage, there indeed is an informatized/computerized society with a minority of Europeans which are heavy users of information technologies. This social trend has also given rise to a counter trend of conscious un-informatized which are educated, upper-class individuals who deliberately and consciously choose not to abide by the rules of consumption of a societal model that they consider to be in contradiction with their system of values. In between one finds a larger noise society, a community of moderate or low users which is essentially 'passive' to the media system and which uses enough technologies to bear all the consequences of the competition between media. This community may adopt a passive stance in media consumption, use intensively TV technologies, seek entertainment as a substitute for interpersonal communication or as a way to re-acquire a psychological relief against the complexities and the pressures of living in a modern society.
Towards 'new illiteracy'?
In spite of the recurrent claims of ever-more user-friendliness, information and communication technologies use remains strongly subordinated to a set of specific skills. These evolve along with innovation, but tend to grow in importance as the complexity of the technologies as well as the scope of their applications extends. These sets of skills go well beyond managing the interfaces needed to operate them. Broadly speaking, new media are increasingly associated with new writing, and hence new reading, not to mention new ways to organize, treat, retrieve and control information in its broadest sense.
The so-called new literacy will soon lead developed societies into difficulties comparable to that of illiteracy in the 19th century. Like the illiterate of those times, the new illiterate will be, as we can clearly see from the diffusion patterns of new technologies, of lower social status, with the associated lower income and level of education. Medium-term developments may lead to a dichotomized social body made of, on the one hand, wealthier, better educated and new literates having the skills and the means to access and use information and communication technologies and, on the other hand, poorer, less educated and new illiterates kept out of the new tech scene and deprived of most technologies and hence denied access to an increasing amount of information and culture. Therefore, Francis Bacon's famous saying -Knowledge is Power -could be replaced by the capacity and speed to access, select and reproduce knowledge will determine power in the next century.
Back to the future
The question of whether new media will grow at the expense of traditional media is of particular importance to the industry. Unsurprisingly, the first tangible signs of decreased television viewing among Internet heavy users are now showing in the United States. At the same time one notices a rise in television viewing behavior as well.
One core characteristic of many new technologies makes any kind of prediction even more audacious: integration. The Internet in its most popular form (the World Wide Web) seems to hold characteristics that might grow into true media integration. All forms of media (broadcast) and interpersonal communication are likely, sooner or later, to be transposed or accessible via a unique interface organized around the Internet. In theory, a device that would be small enough to be portable, yet large enough to ensure perceptive comfort, could well replace everything from the personal computer to the walkman, telephone to television and video recorder, fax and answering machine, newspaper and radio, movie theater and advertising posters, bookshop and libraries, shopping malls and city halls. Integration of all existing vectors of communication (and much more) would also give rise to an endless number of hybrid combinations prompting changes in behavior of such a magnitude that it would, if accessible to a large population, deeply reorganize social structures as we know them.
The Internet can be considered as emblematic of the new technologies. Given that it takes skills (education) and money (equipment and running cost), using the Internet is to be viewed as a major landmark in new technologies' penetration. Internet users have indeed gone over the hurdle that is most likely to keep people away from technology, and having done that are likely adopters of downstream technologies, as long as these remain within continuous innovations.
Surprisingly, there is no linear relationship between proportions of non-users saying they are interested and of those saying they are planning to purchase an Internet connection within 6 months. Finland shows the highest proportion of interested non-users and near highest proportion of purchasers within 6 months. To a lesser extent, Luxembourg, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden are quite promising markets as well. Ireland and France, on the other hand, appear quite high on the interest side, but below average in intention to purchase, while Austria stands out as very low on interest, and barely average on intention to purchase. The remaining countries gravitate around the EU average.
This also shows that it is the markets with highest levels of Internet use that also hold the highest potential for short-term growth. This is to say that the diffusion pattern of the Internet can be seen, at this stage, as animated by a snowball effect or marketing hype.
Conclusions
Six general conclusions can be drawn: First, whether we like it or not, the information society in Europe is 'a society in formation' and certainly not imminently emerging.
Second, there is no single road to the information society. Every country has its own particularities and these are very heavily determined by national political objectives.
A third conclusion is that there is extensive information society planning occurring now despite the supposed obsolescence of state planning due to the policies of liberalization and the flexible circumstances that an information society is supposed to require.
A fourth and related conclusion is the widespread support for the same visions in a period where the 'great narratives' are said to be vanishing. Information society visions have clearly become such a new narrative.
Fifth, the Internet in its most popular form (the World Wide Web) seems to hold characteristics that might grow into true media integration. However, on the content side it remains to be seen whether it will not become another divide comparable to the 'old' media.
Sixth, another kind of capital difference between groups with different socioeconomic status is emerging. A high percentage of the population is excluded as users of the new media, due to their educational and financial status. Additionally, a new phenomenon of ''pleonastic exclusion'' is taking place, as a result of the enormous numbers of channels of communication, which forces audiences to a continuous selection-exclusion of information sources.
By way of conclusion we would like to present a number of recommendations for consideration to policymakers and researchers (adapted from Ricci, 2000 and Heinderyckx, 1998) .
New directions for the policymaker
To liberate information technology and to cultivate further growth in Europe, policymakers and corporations should envisage the introduction of a series of new priorities.
The first priority should be to increase the social dimension of the policy. Patterns of behavior found in the MIS and in other surveys indicate that usage of electronic media is correlated to structural levels of economic development. There is a huge economic deficit that de facto reduces many people's opportunities offered by the new technologies. Usage of IT can become a constituting element for a new categorization of social classes. Unless specific policies are put in place to reduce the gender gap, women risk occupying the lower castes of the new ICT-based social segmentation.
The second priority should be to develop new forms of awareness raising activities. Europeans perceive applications as relatively important for their life because their pertinence cannot be immediately perceived through generic promises. Waving the icon of the Internet does not per se mobilize customers. It is its pertinence to their professional priorities that matters.
The third priority concerns the support to cross-country research. Measuring how many use a computer is not enough; surveys have to go deeper and must understand whether the neutral information society has any chance to evolve into a 'knowledge society' or whether it is going to become foremost an entertainment society. High PC/Internet penetration means little if PCs are mostly used as entertainment machines (and not as knowledge management tools).
The fourth priority should be the re-formulation of the economic drivers of the digital growth. Trans-nationality should be the shaping factors of the new policies for the development of e-commerce. The digital economy exists, the MIS shows it, but it is located beyond our borders and we need a market that is capable of turning the transnational potential into revenues for local entrepreneurs. The European integration could find in the 'digital internal market' the milestone of the globalization era.
New directions for research
Conducting research on a fast-evolving subject is quite challenging. Yet, decisionmakers at all levels can only make adequate choices based on reliable research material, so that there is an urgent need for new and on-going research in at least six areas.
First, a multi-media approach to the new technologies should understand how the mutations of the media landscape affects each media, its audience, its content, its interaction with others. Are new media a threat to the established ones or are they a unique opportunity for them to gain audiences? Will convergence and digitalization lead to a new, distinct media or will it gradually absorb all other forms into a unique interface?
Second, information and communication technologies are to be studied in a timebudget perspective. The time that people have available for communication activities and media consumption is limited. Traces of lower television viewing in heavy Internet-using households are beginning to be found, leading to essential questions about which activities are reduced to free up the necessary time to use the spreading new technologies. How does it affect reading books, magazines or newspapers, watching television, listening to radio, participation in cultural activities, community involvement, etc.? How does the current evolution affect the work/leisure balance in people's time-budget?
Third, questions are raised about the content conveyed by these new technologies. How much do the new media represent new forms of communication, and how do these new forms affect the public's perception of the world? Beyond forms, people using these new technologies tend to have access to content that before was either out of reach, or simply did not exist. How will that affect their personality, their interests, their level of information and education, their behavior, etc.? How different are the new forms of writing? How can they be improved? What skills need to be developed among audiences so as to make the best of these new forms?
Fourth, there is an urgent need for large-scale research about the social and cultural implications of the current evolution. While the communication companies tend to merge into worldwide giants, the technology tends to allow for ever-smaller communities to emerge and consolidate. Specialized media, thematic channels, web sites and chat rooms allow individuals with narrow fields of interest to develop a particular passion, share it with people sharing that interest, and provide the means to gather individuals into groups that could not otherwise have existed. All personal investment in these groups (be it time or money) is made at the expense of other fields of interest, including that of the traditional communities. This might lead to a complete restructuring of social groups as we know them.
Fifth, the theories of globalization/localization have been challenged, criticized and modified, but few would deny that they do offer a fertile ground for research. We advocate a convergent and integrated approach in studying the complex and intricate relations between globalization/localization, consumption and identity. Culture is an important factor, either facilitating the transnationalization of national or local cultural industries or impeding further growth of global media. Global media may be largest in terms of coverage; however, their size shrinks significantly if measured in terms of viewing rate.
While some national programs are successful because of their distinct cultural characteristics, others may achieve similar success by promoting foreign values. During a dynamic process of change, it is the interaction of factors that brings about endless possibilities.
Finally -and this applies to all above-mentioned research areas -there is a need for more qualitative research on these matters. Karvalics and Molnar (2000) , for instance, ask: What do we know about the 'average' Internet-user, the Netizen? What about his personality, his universe of values, his social contacts and future? There are plenty of fears, reserves and aversions that describe the informatization process as a dehumanizing, Orwellian scenario. The complexity of the phenomena at hand cannot be fully appreciated by sheer quantitative research. There comes a point when the observations need to be explained and refined, and that can only be achieved by qualitative methods which, although more difficult to implement, though less operational in appearance, provide the indispensable level of detail necessary to appreciate behavioral phenomena of this magnitude.
